Abstract. The von Neumann and Newman poker models are simplified two-person poker models in which hands are modeled by real values drawn uniformly at random from the unit interval. We analyze a simple extension of both models that introduces an element of uncertainty about the final strength of each player's own hand, as is present in real poker games. Whenever a showdown occurs, an unfair coin with fixed bias q is tossed, 0 ≤ q ≤ 1/2. With probability 1 − q, the higher hand value wins as usual, but with the remaining probability q, the lower hand wins. Both models favour the first player for q = 0 and are fair for q = 1/2. Our somewhat surprising result is that the first player's expected payoff increases with q as long as q is not too large. That is, the first player can exploit the additional uncertainty introduced by the coin toss and extract even more value from his opponent.
Introduction
Simplified models of poker were first studied in a game theoretic framework by Borel [3] and von Neumann [12] in the 1920s. Von Neumann's results were published later in the seminal book Theory of Games and Economic Behavior with Morgenstern [13] . He considered the following (0, 1) twoplayer game: There is an initial pot of size P (consisting of player's antes). Each player is dealt a 'hand', i.e., a real number x, respectively y, drawn independently and uniformly at random from the unit interval. After X has inspected x, he can make a bet of a chips or check. If he bets, Y can either call (i.e., match X's bet of a chips) or fold (i.e., concede the pot to X), where of course he can base this decision on his own hand y. If X checks or if his bet is called by Y, a showdown occurs, i.e., both hands are revealed and the player with the higher hand value wins the pot and all bets made. Note that only X is allowed to make a bet. Thus he has an advantage over Y, who can only react.
In the above model, one can either prescribe the amount a that X bets if he opts to bet, or let X choose the size of his bet freely as a function of his hand x. The former case is the game originally studied by von Neumann. Here we assume a = P (pot size bet) for simplicity. Von Neumann showed that in optimal play X has an expected payoff of 5/9 P . A key insight of his solution is that bluffing is a game-theoretic necessity: X will not only bet with his good hands, but also with very low-ranked hands. These bluff-bets aim at inducing his opponent to make more calls, even with only mediocre hands, which in turn enables X to extract more value from Y with his good hands. The case of variable bet size a(x) was studied by Newman [9] in the 1950s. Certainly, in this setup player X has an even greater advantage -Newman proved an expected payoff of 4/7 P in optimal play.
Several extensions and variants of these poker models have been studied in the literature. In particular, there are two 'intermediate' models in which X can choose his bet more freely than * The author was supported by UBS AG. † The author was supported by Swiss National Science Foundation, grant 200020-119918. in von Neumann's model, but not completely unrestricted as in Newman's model: Karlin and Restrepo [8] (see also [10] ) analyzed the case where X may choose his bet a from a finite number of prescribed bet sizes a 1 , . . . , a n , and Sakai [10] investigated the case where X is allowed to choose his bet freely in an interval [0, a max ]. Much research was also devoted to analyzing more complex bet structures, in which both X and Y are allowed to bet, raise, or re-raise [2, 5, 6, 7, 8 ].
1.1. The von Neumann and Newman model with flip. We consider the following extension of the above model: whenever a showdown occurs, an unfair coin with bias q is tossed, where 0 ≤ q ≤ 1/2 is a fixed parameter known to both players. With probability 1 − q, the higher hand value wins as usual, but with the remaining probability q, the lower hand wins. We shall refer to this as a flip of the hand values: initially strong hands become weak, and vice versa. This extension is motivated by the fact that in most real world poker variants, players are not only ignorant about the opponent's hand, but also about their own final hand value. In Texas Hold'em for example, a player's final hand strength is a function of both his private hand cards and so-called 'community cards' that are revealed over the course of the game; a weak starting hand thus may turn into a very strong hand at showdown if the right community cards appear.
Obviously, setting q = 0 yields the original von Neumann and Newman models, and the expected payoffs of X in optimal play are as given above. In the other extreme q = 1/2, each player has probability 1/2 of having the better hand at showdown, regardless of the realizations of x and y. Thus, for q = 1/2 the game reduces to a fair coin toss and neither player will have an advantage: Y will call every bet, and regardless of X's strategy each player has expected payoff P/2 in both models.
In light of these two extreme cases, one might be tempted to conclude that the uncertainty about player's own hands introduced by the flip is always bad for the bettor X, who is in control of the game (recall that Y can only react). More specifically, one might think that player X's expected payoff as a function of q is decreasing on the entire interval [0, 1/2]. As we shall see, something altogether different is true.
1.2.
Our results. An equilibrium of a two-player game is a pair of (possibly randomized) strategies such that no player can improve his expected payoff by unilaterally changing his strategy. In other words, each strategy is a best response to the other one. As it is well-known, in two-player constantsum games all equilibria have the same expected payoffs, and thus we may define the value of such a game as the expected payoff of the first player X in any equilibrium pair of strategies (if one exists). Clearly, the poker games introduced above are constant-sum with sum P , and we shall present explicit equilibrium pairs of strategies for both games. Let V I (q) and V II (q) be the values of the von Neumann game (with pot size bet) and the Newman game with flip probability q, respectively. Certainly, we have V II (q) ≥ V I (q) for all values of q, as in Newman's model player X is allowed more flexibility in his betting strategy than in von Neumann's.
We first present our results for the von Neumann game. As mentioned above, we have V I (0) = 5/9 P ≈ 0.556 P in the classical case without flip, and trivially V I (1/2) = P/2. Theorem 1. The value of von Neumann poker with pot size bet and flip probability q is
We give a proof of Theorem 1 in Section 2. Figure 1 shows V I (q) graphically. V I (q) first increases as we increase q, and attains its unique maximum for q = 1/3 with a value of 7/12 P ≈ 0.583 P . In [1/3, 1/2], V I (q) decreases linearly. In other words, as we increase the parameter q, player X can exploit this additional uncertainty about the outcome of the game and extract even more value from his opponent at first! Only beyond q = 1/3, X gradually loses his advantage.
This behaviour of the value function is related to von Neumann's observation about bluffing and can be explained as follows: As q increases, X has to make less and less bluff-bets, since gradually the flip q takes over and induces Y into calling enough of X's bets. At q = 1/3 something important happens -as we shall show, at this point the optimal strategies change abruptly (cf. Figure 2 in Section 2): For q > 1/3, Y calls every bet since his expected payoff is positive regardless of the hands x and y. Thus the need for X to bluff vanishes completely, and he can concentrate on extracting value from Y with his good hands. Due to the abrupt change of strategy, V I (q) is continuous but not smooth at q = 1/3. The value 1/3 stems from our assumption that a = P ; in general, this change of strategies occurs at q * satisfying q * /(1 − q * ) = a/(P + a), i.e., at the point where the odds of a flip occurring equal Y's 'pot odds'. We now present our results for the Newman model. We find it quite remarkable that V II (q) turns out to have the simple closed form below, as the calculations involved are far more complicated than in the von Neumann case.
Theorem 2. The value of Newman poker with flip probability q is
We give a proof of Theorem 2 in Section 3. As shown in Figure 1 , V II (q) increases from 4/7 P ≈ 0.571 P to 31/48 P ≈ 0.646 P . Unlike in the von Neumann game, the value function increases in the entire interval [0, 1/2): As the outcome of the game becomes more and more uncertain, X's advantage gets larger and larger. We attribute the discontinuity at q = 1/2 to the fact that X's bet size a is unlimited. (In fact, in the optimal strategies we present a(x) diverges both at x = 0 and x = 1 for all values of q, cf. Figure 3 in Section 3.) We believe that if a limit on the bet size is imposed as in [10] , this discontinuity disappears and V II (q) attains a maximum at some q 0 < 1/2 instead, similar to the behaviour of V I (q).
An interesting feature of the equilibrium pair of strategies we exhibit is that they are discontinuous at a * satisfying q/(1 − q) = a * /(P + a * ) (cf. Figure 3 in Section 3): Y will call all bets of at most a * since for such bets his expected payoff is nonnegative regardless of the hands x and y. Knowing this, X never bets an amount between 0 and a * . Thus, again the equation q/(1 − q) = a/(P + a) determining the point where the odds of a flip equal Y's pot odds plays a vital role.
The von Neumann Model
In this section we prove Theorem 1. We give an explicit equilibrium pair of deterministic strategies, and compute the value of the game from there.
Recall that in the von Neumann poker model player X can decide whether to check or to bet a = P after inspecting his hand x. If X bets, Y either calls or folds depending on his hand y.
Formally, a deterministic strategy for X is given by an arbitrary (measurable) subset B ⊆ (0, 1) determining for which hand values x he will make a bet. Similarly, a deterministic strategy for Y is given by an arbitrary (measurable) subset C ⊆ (0, 1) determining with which hands y he will call if X bets.
To make the formulas more understandable we write a for the bet and P for the pot despite the assumption that a = P . Throughout, we neglect the case x = y, which occurs with probability 0.
2.1. The case 1/3 < q < 1/2. We show that for any fixed q ∈ (1/3, 1/2), an equilibrium pair of strategies is given by
In words, X bets the better half of his hands, and Y calls every bet regardless of his hand.
Claim 3. Y's calling strategy (4) is a best response to any betting strategyB of player X.
Proof. Note that if Y folds, his payoff is 0, and if he calls with a hand of y, his expected payoff conditional on X having a hand x > y is
while his expected payoff conditional on X having a hand x < y is (P + a)(1 − q) − aq .
As for 1/2 > q > 1/3 = a/(P + 2a) both (5) and (6) are positive, calling all bets of X indeed corresponds to Y's pointwise optimal behaviour, regardless of X's strategy.
Claim 4. X's betting strategy (3) is a best response to Y's calling strategy (4).
Proof. As Y always calls, X's expected payoff if he bets with a hand of x is given by
and if he checks, by
Here x and 1 − x are the probabilities that Y's hand y is lower, resp. higher than x. Since (7) is larger than (8) for x > 1/2 and smaller for x < 1/2, (3) indeed is a pointwise best response to Y's calling strategy (4). 4). Combining (7, 8) and using that a = P , we obtain
.
Integrating E x over (0, 1) we obtain V I (q) as stated in Theorem 1 for the case 1/3 < q ≤ 1/2.
2.2. The case 0 ≤ q ≤ 1/3. Before we state and verify an explicit equilibrium pair of strategies, we briefly outline how such strategies can be derived heuristically. We use the well-known principle of indifference, a more detailed description of which can be found e.g. in [4] .
We assume that player X bets if and only if his hand x is in the interval (0, x 0 ) (bluff bets) or in (x 1 , 1) (value bets) for some fixed numbers x 0 , x 1 ∈ (0, 1). Similarly, we assume that Y calls a bet of X if and only if his hand y is in [y 1 , 1) for some fixed y 1 ,
Assume that Y's calling threshold y 1 is fixed and known to X. If X bets with a hand x ≤ y 1 , his payoff is given by y 1 P + (1 − y 1 ) (P + a)q − a(1 − q) . Here the first term corresponds to the case where Y folds, and the second one to the case where Y calls. Clearly, X should bet if and only if this exceeds (8) , which is his expected payoff if he checks. For continuity reasons, at his bluff threshold x 0 the two options should have the same expected payoff ('at x 0 , X is indifferent between betting or checking'), which yields the indifference equation
Similarly, X's indifference between checking and betting at x 1 yields the equation
and from Y's indifference at y 1 between calling and folding we obtain
Solving the equation system (9, 10, 11) observing that a = P yields
where D = 3 (9q 2 − 10q + 3). Note that x 0 < y 1 < x 1 for all values of q. Figure 2 illustrates these thresholds as q varies from 0 to 1/3.
We prove that for any fixed q ∈ [0, 1/3], an equilibrium is given by the following pair of strategies. Player X bets if and only if his hand x is in
and player Y calls a bet of X if and only if his hand y is in
where x 0 , x 1 and y 1 given by (12, 13, 14) .
The fact that the strategies (15, 16) are in equilibrium is proved by the two following claims. is a best response to X's betting strategy (15).
Proof. Assume that Y has a hand of y and is faced with a bet. Clearly, if he folds, his payoff is 0. If he calls, his expected payoff is the weighted average of (5, 6), where the weights are the probabilities that x > y, resp. x < y, conditional on x ∈ B (i.e., X making a bet). If Y's hand y is between x 0 and x 1 , these conditional probabilities are proportional to 1 − x 1 resp. x 0 , and Y's expected payoff is some constant times the left hand side of (11), which vanishes for x 0 and x 1 as defined in (12, 13) . Thus for hands between x 0 and x 1 , calling and folding have the same expected payoff.
For y < x 0 , the conditional probabilities in question are proportional to (1 − x 1 ) + (x 0 − y) and y respectively. Thus the smaller term (5) gets strictly larger weight, and Y's expected payoff when calling is negative. Analogously it follows that his expected payoff when calling with a hand y > x 1 is positive. Together this shows that any strategy satisfying (17, 18) corresponds to pointwise optimal behaviour of Y, which proves the claim.
Claim 6. X's betting strategy (15) is a best response to Y's calling strategy (16).
Proof. The expected payoff for X if he checks with a hand of x is given by (8) . On the other hand, if he bets with a hand x ≤ y 1 , his expected payoff is
independently of x, and if he bets with a hand with a hand x > y 1 ,
where we used that a = P and y 1 as defined in (14). Straightforward calculation yields that (19) is larger than (8) for x < x 0 and that (20) is larger than (8) for x > x 1 , reflecting equalities (9) and (10). Thus (15) is a best response to Y's calling strategy (16). 16). Combining (8, 19, 20) , we obtain
Integrating E x over [0, 1] we obtain V I (q) as stated in Theorem 1 for the case 0 ≤ q ≤ 1/3.
The Newman Model
In this section we prove Theorem 2. As in the previous section, we give an equilibrium pair of deterministic strategies for players X and Y, and compute the value of the game from there. Throughout, we assume that 0 ≤ q < 1/2. As argued in the introduction, the case q = 1/2 is trivial.
Recall that in the Newman poker model, X can choose the size of his bet a freely as a function of his hand x. In this formulation, if X wants to check, he does so by choosing bet size a = 0. Y sees the size of the bet, and can use this information together with his hand value y in deciding whether or not to call. Before we state and verify an explicit equilibrium pair of strategies, we outline the heuristics that lead to these strategies. First of all, recall that the expected payoff of Y when calling a bet of a is given by (5, 6) . Since for a at most a * = q 1 − 2q P both terms are nonnegative, Y will call every bet of at most a * . Similarly to Section 2.1, it follows that X should never bet an amount 0 < a < a * with hands below 1/2, and should always bet at least a * with hands above 1/2.
In view of the findings in the von Neumann poker model about mixing value bets with one's best hands and bluff bets with one's worst hands, we assume that X plays as follows: He bets a > a * if and only if his hand is either x 0 (a) or x 1 (a) for some functions x 0,1 : [a * , ∞) → (0, 1). We assume that x 0 (a) is strictly decreasing with lim a→∞ x 0 (a) = 0, and that x 1 (a) is strictly increasing with lim a→∞ x 1 (a) = 1 (cf. Figure 3 below). The function x 0 (a) corresponds to X's bluff bets, and x 1 (a) to his value bets. For Y's calling strategy, we assume that he calls a bet of a > a * if and only if his hand is greater or equal than y 1 (a) for some function y 1 : [a * , ∞) → (0, 1). We assume that x 0 (a) ≤ y 1 (a) ≤ x 1 (a) for a ∈ [a * , ∞). We will use the notations
Assume first that Y's strategy is fixed, and that X has a hand of x. Knowing Y's strategy y 1 (a), if X bets he will bet the amount which maximizes his expected payoff. For bluff bets this expected payoff is f (a) = y 1 (a) P + (1 − y 1 (a)) (P + a)q − a(1 − q) , independently of x. First-order condition yields
for a ∈ (a * , ∞). Similarly, for X's value bets the expected payoff is g(a) = y 1 (a) P +(x−y 1 (a)) (P + a)(1 − q) − aq + (1 − x) (P + a)q − a(1 − q) , and first-order condition yields
from which we derive the indifference equation
for a ∈ (a * , ∞) (note that we replaced x by x 1 (a) after taking the derivative). Now suppose that X's strategy is fixed. If Y is faced with a bet of a > a * , clearly his payoff is 0 if he folds. From a bet of a player Y can deduce that X either bluffs with the hand x 0 (a) or bets for value with the hand x 1 (a). For a hand x 0 (a) ≤ y ≤ x 1 (a), he will call if his expected payoff h(a) is positive. To calculate h(a), he needs to take into account the probability with which a bet of a is a bluff compared to a being a value bet. This ratio of bluff bets to value bets of a is given by the ratio of the slopes −x 0 (a) and x 1 (a), and with (5, 6) (recall that we assumed x 0 (a) ≤ y 1 (a) ≤ x 1 (a)) we obtain the third equation
for a ∈ (a * , ∞).
Solving the system of differential equations (21, 23, 24) requires further boundary conditions. We require that at X's bluff threshold x * 0 = x 0 (a * ), checking and betting a * should have the same expected payoff, i.e.,
The last boundary condition is given by the assumption
Solving the system of differential equations (21, 23, 24) under the boundary conditions (25, 26) yields
Moreover, straightforward calculation gives
Note that for all values of q we have x * 0 < y * 1 < x * 1 . We shall prove that for 0 ≤ q < 1/2 an equilibrium is given by the following pair of strategies, where x 0 (a), x 1 (a), y 1 (a), x * 0 , x * 1 , and a * are as defined above. As a function of his hand x, player X bets an amount of
Since both
Player Y, holding a hand of y, calls a bet of a if and only if (y, a) is in In order to verify that these strategies indeed form an equilibrium pair, we prove two stronger claims, showing that if one of the two strategies is fixed, there is in fact a large class of deterministic counterstrategies.
Claim 7. Any calling strategyC of player Y satisfying
is a best response to X's betting strategy (30).
Proof. We first show that the restrictions (32, 33, 34) reflect the pointwise optimal behaviour of Y when faced with a bet of a holding a hand of y.
Recall that Y's expected payoff when calling is given by (5) or (6) . If Y is faced with a bet of size a > a * , there are exactly two hands X can possibly have: a value bet hand x 1 (a) and a bluff bet hand x 0 (a), where x 0 (a) < x 1 (a). Thus with any hand y < x 0 (a), Y's expected payoff is given by (5) and is strictly less than (P + a * )q − a * (1 − q) = 0, since (5) is decreasing in a. Conversely, with any hand y > x 1 (a), Y's expected payoff is given by (6) and strictly larger than (P + a * )(1 − q) − a * q = P > 0. As moreover for a ≤ a * both (5) or (6) are nonnegative, his expected payoff will be nonnegative when calling such hands, regardless of his hand y. This proves that indeed the restrictions given by (32, 33, 34) correspond to Y's pointwise optimal behaviour.
1 An alternative equilibrium pair is obtained by replacing x0(a) with x * 0 − x0(a), as is done in [9] . Instead of betting arbitrarily large amounts a as x approaches 0, X's bet size then diverges as x → x * 0 .
It remains to show that it is completely irrelevant what Y does in the remaining situations (y, a).
For a fixed hand y and any call strategyC satisfying (32, 33, 34), his expected payoff against X's strategy (30) conditional on no flip occurring is
for some function C 0 (y) independent fromC. Similarly, conditional on a flip occurring the expected payoff of player Y is
for some other function C 1 (y) independent fromC. Combining (35, 36) and using the fact that x 0 (a), x 1 (a) as defined in (27, 28) satisfy (24) yield that the total expected payoff against X's strategy (30) for a fixed hand y is (1 − q) C 0 (y) + q C 1 (y), independently fromC.
is a best response to Y's calling strategy (31).
Proof. The first decision X has to make is whether to bet an amount a > a * or an amount 0 ≤ a ≤ a * . As in the latter case Y will always call, X's expected payoff is given by (7) and thus maximized for a = 0 if x < 1/2, and for a = a * if x > 1/2. The resulting expected payoffs are
and x (P + a * )(1 − q) − a * q + (1 − x) (P + a * )q − a(1 − q) = P x ,
respectively.
We need to compare these values to the expected payoff X can achieve by betting more than a * . Betting any amount a > a * with a hand of x ≤ y 1 (a) yields an expected payoff of y 1 (a) P + (1 − y 1 (a)) (P + a)q − a(1 − q) = P (1 + 4q)/(7 − 2q) ,
independently of a and x. (This independence of a is a consequence of the fact that y 1 (a) as defined in (29) satisfies (21).) Comparing (39) to (37) shows that for hands x < (1 − q)/(7 − 2q) = x * 0 , this is indeed better than checking, reflecting the boundary condition (25).
Similarly, betting any amount a > a * with a hand of x > y 1 (a) yields an expected payoff of y 1 (a) P + (x − y 1 (a)) (P + a)(1 − q) − aq + (1 − x) (P + a)q − a(1 − q) ,
which is increasing for a near a * and decreasing for a → ∞, as can be seen from the expression in (22). Thus the expected payoff is maximized for the unique a ∈ (a * , ∞) satisfying (22), which is a satisfying x 1 (a) = x (cf. (23)). The resulting expected payoff is P 10(2 − q)/(7 − 2q) − x − 4 3(1 − x)(1 − q)/(7 − 2q) ,
as is found by inverting (28) and plugging the resulting function a(x) into (40). Comparing this to (38) shows that for hands x > (4 + q)/(7 − 2q) = x * 1 this is indeed better than the alternative of betting a * .
From the equilibrium pair of deterministic strategies (30, 31), we can easily calculate the value of the game. Let E x denote X's expected payoff when holding a hand of x, with X and Y playing strategies (30, 31). Combining (37, 38, 39, 41), we obtain , x ∈ (x * 1 , 1)
Integrating E x over (0, 1) we obtain V II (q) as stated in Theorem 2.
